According to the Lucas-Stokey result, a government can structure its debt maturity to guarantee commitment to optimal fiscal policy by future governments. In this paper, we overturn this conclusion, showing that it does not generally hold in the same model and under the same definition of time-consistency as in LucasStokey. Our argument rests on the existence of an overlooked commitment problem that cannot be remedied with debt maturity: a government in the future will not tax on the downward slopping side of the Laffer curve, even if it is ex-ante optimal to do so. In light of this finding, we propose a new framework to characterize timeconsistent policy. We consider a Markov Perfect Competitive Equilibrium, where a government reoptimizes sequentially and may deviate from the optimal commitment policy. We find that, in a deterministic economy, any stationary distribution of debt maturity must be flat, with the government owing the same amount at all future dates.
Introduction
In a seminal paper, Lucas and Stokey (1983) consider a closed economy with no capital in which the government finances exogenous spending with taxes and debt. They argue that if the government can issue a sufficiently rich maturity of bonds, then the optimal policy is time-consistent. That is, if given the opportunity to reevaluate policy ex-post, the government would choose the ex-ante optimal policy. This result has led to a large literature that builds on this analysis, such as Alvarez et al. (2004) , Persson et al. (2006) , and Debortoli et al. (2017) , among others.
In this paper, we overturn this conclusion, showing that it does not generally hold in the same model and under the same definition of time-consistency as in Lucas-Stokey. Our argument rests on a simple example in which a commitment problem arises that cannot be remedied with debt maturity. In this example, the government wants to roll over some initial short-term debt. If initial debt is small enough, optimal policy under commitment requires future governments to choose low tax rates on the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve, and the policy is time-consistent. In contrast, and more interestingly, if initial debt is large enough, optimal policy under commitment requires future governments to choose high tax rates on the downward sloping portion of the Laffer curve. This is optimal ex-ante since the reduction in future consumption decreases shortterm interest rates today, allowing today's government to roll over debt at a lower cost. However, a problem arises since the government tomorrow strictly prefers to repay any rolled over debt with a lower tax rate on the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve, as this maximizes consumption and welfare ex-post. Therefore, the optimal policy under commitment cannot be sustained under lack of commitment: the government in the future would never choose the preferred future tax rate of the government today, independently of the inherited government debt maturity.
Our argument does not rely on the presence of non-concavities in the government's program and multiplicity of solutions at any date. Our example uses commonly applied isoelastic preferences in which the program is concave and the constraint set is convex at all dates. We show that under these preferences, the Lucas-Stokey procedure for guaranteeing time-consistency need not always work. More specifically, the procedure takes the optimal commitment allocation and then selects a sequence of debt portfolios and Lagrange multipliers (on future governments' budget constraints) to satisfy future governments' first order conditions under this allocation. Assuming future debt portfolios are positive at all maturities, this procedure guarantees time-consistency if the constructed future Lagrange multipliers are all positive. However, the procedure is invalid if some constructed multipliers are negative, since the shadow cost of debt cannot be negative along the equilibrium path. When the constructed multiplier is negative, today's government and the future government disagree as to which tax rate should be chosen to satisfy the future budget constraint, and optimal policy is not time-consistent. From a practical viewpoint, this observation means that implementation of the Lucas-Stokey procedure to guarantee time-consistency may be valid, but it must be checked quantitatively. In some economies, the procedure works, whereas in others-like in our example-it does not.
1
Given the limitations of the Lucas-Stokey analysis, we propose an alternative approach to studying fiscal policy under lack of commitment. Rather than analyzing whether the optimal commitment policy survives a one-time future reoptimization, as in Lucas-Stokey, we characterize the Markov Perfect Competitive Equilibrium (MPCE). In our setup, the government without commitment chooses taxes and debt at every date, taking into account how current policy affects the price of bonds through expectations of future policy. Moreover, the government may decide not to follow the optimal commitment policy. We characterize the entire set of MPCE's in a deterministic economy, including those with potentially discontinuous policy functions both on and off the equilibrium path.
2 Since we allow for any unconstrained structure of maturity issuance, the payoff relevant state-the government's portfolio of inherited maturities-is an infinite-dimensional and potentially complicated object. We focus our attention on the stationary maturity distribution that emerges when the inherited portfolio of maturities equals the issued portfolio. Our main result is that any stationary maturity distribution under lack of commitment must be flat, with the government owing the same amount at all future dates. The fact that a flat maturity distribution is stationary is not surprising. Under a flat maturity distribution, the government lacking commitment can choose a tax rate to repay the debt immediately due without rebalancing its portfolio. The chosen tax rate coincides with the optimum under full commitment, and therefore maximizes government's welfare. What is less obvious is why no other maturity distribution is stationary. The reason is that a government that inherits a non-flat maturity distribution would always take advantage of the situation to front-load or back-load taxes in order to change interest rates. When the government does this, the issued maturity distribution does not coincide with the inherited one, implying that the inherited distribution is not stationary.
For example, suppose that the government inherits more long-term liabilities than short-term ones. Rather than issue the same maturity distribution as the inherited one, the government can change taxes so as to increase short-term interest rates. This relaxes the government budget constraint by decreasing the market value of outstanding long-term liabilities, making the government strictly better off. The opposite is true if the government inherits more short-term liabilities than long-term ones. In this case, a policy that decreases short-term interest rates makes the government strictly better off by increasing the market value of newly issued liabilities. We apply this simple logic to analyze the behavior of the government inheriting any infinite-dimensional maturity distribution. We show that only if the inherited maturity distribution is flat is the government unable to take advantage of imbalances in debt positions to relax its budget constraint. As such, any stationary maturity distribution must be flat.
Our analysis thus provides a theoretical argument for the use of consols in debt management based on the sequential optimization of fiscal policy by the government. The use of consols has been pursued historically, most notably by the British government during the Industrial Revolution, when consols were the largest component of the British government's debt (see Mokyr, 2011) . Moreover, the introduction of consols has been discussed as a potential option in the management of U.S. government debt (e.g. Cochrane, 2015) .
Related Literature
The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the limitations of the Lucas-Stokey analysis, and to offer an alternative approach to the study of optimal fiscal policy under lack of commitment. Our work also contributes to a literature on optimal government debt maturity in the absence of government commitment. We depart from this literature in two ways. First, we consider the optimal maturity without imposing arbitrary constraints on the bonds available to the government.
3 Second, our model is most applicable to economies where the risk of default and surprise in inflation are not salient, but the government is still not committed to a path of taxes and debt maturity issuance. 4 In this regard, our paper is related to the quantitative analysis of Debortoli et al. (2017) . We differ from this work in two respects. First, we do not arbitrarily confine the set of bonds available to the government, as they do. Second, we consider a deterministic economy and ignore the presence of shocks. 5 These two departures allow us to achieve exact theoretical characterization of the stationary maturity distribution. Our finding that the maturity distribution is exactly flat is consistent with their quantitative result that the maturity distribution is approximately flat. Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section 3, we show that the availability of rich debt maturities does not guarantee the timeconsistency of optimal policy, using the same definition of time-consistency as in LucasStokey. In Section 4, we move beyond Lucas-Stokey and formally define an MPCE. Section 5 establishes that any stationary maturity distribution under lack of commitment is flat. Section 6 concludes, and the Appendix provides all of the proofs and additional results not included in the text.
Model

Environment
We consider an economy identical to the deterministic case of Lucas-Stokey. There are discrete time periods t = {0, 1, ..., ∞}. The resource constraint of the economy is
where c t is consumption, n t is labor, and g > 0 is government spending, which is exogenous and constant over time.
There is a continuum of mass 1 of identical households that derive the following utility:
u (·) is strictly increasing in consumption, strictly decreasing in labor, globally concave, and continuously differentiable. We also assume that u cc (c, c+g)+u cn (c, c+g) < 0 so that the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in consumption in general equilibrium. As a benchmark, we define the first best consumption and labor c f b , n f b as the values of consumption and labor that maximize u (c t , n t ) subject to the resource constraint (1). Household wages equal the marginal product of labor (which is 1 unit of consumption),
and are taxed at a linear tax rate τ t . b t,k 0 represents government debt purchased by a representative household at t, which is a promise to repay 1 unit of consumption at t + k > t. q t,k is the bond price at t. At every t, the household's allocation and portfolio c t , n t , {b t,k } ∞ k=1 must satisfy the household's dynamic budget constraint:
B t,k 0 represents debt issued by the government at t with a promise to repay 1 unit of consumption at t + k > t. At every t, government policies τ t , g t , {B t,k } ∞ k=1 must satisfy the government's dynamic budget constraint:
The economy is closed, which means that the bonds issued by the government equal the bonds purchased by households:
is exogenous. We assume that there exist debt limits to prevent Ponzi schemes:
In our recursive analysis, we will consider economies where these limits are not binding along the equilibrium path. The government is benevolent and shares the same preferences as the households in (2).
6 We follow the same exposition as in Angeletos (2002) in which the government rebalances its debt in every period by buying back all outstanding debt and then issuing fresh debt at all maturities. This is without loss of generality. For example, if the government at t − k issues debt due at date t of size B t−k,k which it then holds to maturity without issuing additional debt, then all future governments at date t − k + l for l = 1, ..., k − 1 will choose B t−k+l,k−l = B t−k,k , implying that B t−1,1 = B t−k,k .
Primal Approach
We follow Lucas-Stokey by taking the primal approach to the characterization of competitive equilibria, since this allows us to abstract away from bond prices and taxes. Let
represent a sequence of consumption and labor allocations. We can establish necessary and sufficient conditions for (7) to constitute a competitive equilibrium. The household's optimization problem implies the following intratemporal and intertemporal conditions, respectively:
Substitution of these conditions into the household's dynamic budget constraint implies the following condition:
Forward substitution into the above equation and taking into account the absence of Ponzi schemes implies the following implementability condition:
By this reasoning, if a sequence in (7) is generated by a competitive equilibrium, then it necessarily satisfies (1) and (10). We prove in the Appendix that the converse is also true, which leads to the below proposition that is useful for the rest of our analysis.
Lemma 1 (competitive equilibrium) A sequence (7) is a competitive equilibrium if and only if it satisfies (1) ∀t and (10) at t = 0 given {b
Note that this result rests on the fact that the satisfaction of (10) at t = 0 guarantees the satisfaction of (10) for all future dates, since bonds can be freely chosen so as to satisfy (10) at all future dates for any given sequence (7).
Lucas-Stokey Revisited
In this section, we apply the Lucas-Stokey definition of time-consistency, and we provide an example that overturns their conclusion that the optimal policy can be made timeconsistent with the appropriate choice of maturities. We first establish that optimal policy under commitment may require future tax rates to be on the downward sloping side of the Laffer curve. We then show that this implies that optimal policy is not time-consistent, despite the availability of rich maturities.
Policy under Commitment
Consider an economy with isoelastic preferences over consumption c and labor n, where
for η > 0 and γ ≥ 1, which corresponds to a utility function analyzed in Werning (2007) . Under these preferences, (1) and (8) imply that the primary surplus, τ n − g, is equal to c (1 − η (c + g) γ ). To facilitate the discussion, define c laf f er as the level of consumption that maximizes the primary surplus:
c laf f er is the level of consumption associated with the maximal tax revenue at the peak of the Laffer curve under tax rate τ laf f er . We assume that g < Using Lemma 1, we can consider the date 0 government's optimal policy under com-mitment, where we have substituted in for labor using the resource constraint (1):
Equation (14) represents the date 0 implementability condition, which is the present value constraint of the government. Suppose that b −1,1 > 0 and b −1,k = 0 ∀k ≥ 2. To guarantee the existence of a solution that satisfies (14), let
Since initial debt is non-negative, the left hand side of (14)-which can be equivalently written in relaxed form as a weak inequality constraint-is concave, implying that the constraint set is convex. This leads to the following lemma that characterizes the unique optimum under commitment.
Lemma 2 (optimal policy) The unique solution to (13) − (14) satisfies the following conditions:
1. c t = c 1 ∀t ≥ 1, 2. c 0 and c 1 < c 0 are the unique solutions to the following system of equations for some µ 0 > 0
3. There exists b * −1,1 ∈ (0, b) such that the solution admits c 1 > c laf f er if b −1,1 < b equal to zero), tax smoothing and interest rate smoothing from date 1 onward is optimal. The second part of the lemma characterizes the solution in terms of first order conditions for a positive Lagrange multiplier µ 0 on the implementability constraint (14). These conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality given the concavity of the problem. Implicit differentiation of (15) and (16), taking into account second order conditions, implies that initial consumption c 0 exceeds long-run consumption c 1 , which means that the initial tax rate is below the future tax rate. Back-loading tax rates is optimal since the reduction in future consumption relative to present consumption allows the government to roll over its initial short-term debt at a lower interest rate. The last part of the lemma states that if initial short-term debt b −1,1 is sufficiently high, then future consumption c 1 is below c laf f er , implying that the future tax rate τ 1 is above the revenue-maximizing tax rate at the peak of the Laffer curve τ laf f er . This result stems from the fact that the government under commitment accommodates increases in initial short-term debt b −1,1 with a reduction in future consumption c 1 and an increase in the future tax rate τ 1 . Mathematically, higher b −1,1 tightens the implementability constraint (14) which increases the Lagrange multiplier µ 0 on this constraint. From (16), a higher value of µ 0 leads to a lower value of c 1 , and beyond a certain level b * −1,1 , c 1 declines below c laf f er and τ 1 rises above τ laf f er . Conceptually, for c 1 > c laf f er and τ 1 < τ laf f er , the reduction in future consumption c 1 accommodates an increase in initial short-term debt b −1,1 by increasing future revenues and decreasing short-term interest rates. Once c 1 declines beyond c laf f er and τ 1 rises above τ laf f er , the increase in initial short-term debt b −1,1 is accommodated with lower short-term interest rates only. If c 1 < c laf f er and τ 1 > τ laf f er , the government at date 0 could instead choose a value of c 1 > c laf f er and τ 1 < τ laf f er yielding the same future revenue to repay its issued debt. However, doing so is suboptimal and would lead to higher short-term interest rates, significantly reducing the resources raised at date 0 by issuing this debt. implies a higher debt threshold for future taxes to be on the decreasing side of the Laffer curve. We can establish through computational examples that the value of b * −1,1 is increasing in β, decreasing in η, and increasing in γ. Intuitively, taxes are more likely to be on the downward sloping side of the Laffer curve from date 1 onward if either the government is impatient and cares little about future tax distortions (β is low) or if instead tax capacity is limited and low interest rates are required to roll over initial debt (η is high or γ is low).
Time-Consistency of Policy
We now show that the policy under commitment may not be time-consistent. We follow Lucas-Stokey and consider what happens if at date 1, policy is reevaluated and chosen by a government with full commitment from date 1 onward. As in Lucas-Stokey, we define an optimal policy as time-consistent if the government at date 1 chooses the same allocation as the government at date 0.
Given an inherited portfolio of maturities, the government at date 1 solves the following problem:
Letting µ 1 represent the Lagrange multiplier on (19), first order conditions with respect to c t are:
An optimal policy is therefore time-consistent if the solution to ( If b −1,1 < b * −1,1 , then the optimal date 0 policy can be sustained under lack of commitment with the government at date 0 issuing a flat maturity distribution with b 0,k = b 0,1 ∀k ≥ 1. Under such a flat distribution, the government at date 1 optimally chooses to smooth tax rates into the future. Moreover, given that date 1 tax rates under commitment are on the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve, the choice of such tax rates is time-consistent. The date 0 and date 1 government agree about the optimal tax rate to repay this debt.
If instead b −1,1 > b * −1,1 , then the optimal date 0 policy cannot be sustained under lack of commitment. If the government at date 0 tried to induce the date 1 government into a smooth policy from date 1 onward by issuing a flat maturity distribution with b 0,k = b 0,1 ∀k ≥ 1, the date 1 government would never choose a value c 1 < c laf f er and τ 1 > τ laf f er and would instead repay the inherited debt with a value c 1 > c laf f er and τ 1 < τ laf f er . Choosing a lower tax rate on the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve increases consumption and increases welfare ex-post. Thus, while the date 0 government can commit the date 1 government to a smooth path of revenue and interest rates, it cannot commit the date 1 government to a particular tax rate. As such, the optimal date 0 policy is not time-consistent.
Why the Lucas-Stokey Argument Fails
It is instructive to consider why the original arguments of Lucas-Stokey fail in this example. In developing their argument, Lucas-Stokey consider the optimal allocation under commitment from the perspective of date 0, which satisfies the following first order condition for t ≥ 1 (the analog of (16) starting from any arbitrary initial maturity distribution):
Lucas-Stokey claim that the optimal policy under commitment at date 0 that satisfies (21) could be made time-consistent at date 1. They argue that this is possible with the appropriate choice of maturities that satisfy the date 1 implementability condition (19) and the date 1 first order condition (20) for some Lagrange multiplier µ 1 . Their procedure thus combines (20) and (21) to yield:
which determines the issued maturity distribution at date 0 as a function of four objects: the inherited maturity distribution, the optimal allocation, µ 0 , and µ 1 . According to Lucas-Stokey logic, given an optimal allocation and value of µ 0 from the perspective of date 0, a value of µ 1 and a portfolio of bonds {b 0,k } ∞ k=1 that satisfy (19) and (22) exist, and therefore, the policy is time-consistent. To see why their logic fails, suppose for illustration that the implied values of {b 0,k } ∞ k=1 are all non-negative, so that the constraint set represented by (19) at date 1 is convex. If the implied value of µ 1 is positive, then Lucas-Stokey logic holds and the optimal policy is time-consistent. If instead the implied value of µ 1 is negative, then Lucas-Stokey logic fails and the optimal policy is not time-consistent. Intuitively, the solution to (18) − (19) under a positive debt portfolio {b 0,k } ∞ k=1 would never admit a negative multiplier-since the shadow cost of inherited debt is positive-which is why the Lucas-Stokey construction fails in this case.
Our specific example illustrates a situation in which µ 1 < 0 and the Lucas-Stokey construction fails. (19) and (22) in our example can be written as
, and (23)
respectively, for µ 0 and c 1 that satisfy (15) There are two important points to note regarding this example. First, our example does not rely on the presence of non-concavities in the government's program and multiplicity of solutions at any date. Our isoelastic preferences imply that the government's welfare is concave and the constraint set is convex, which guarantees that the solution to the government's problem at dates 0 and 1 is unique. We conjecture that considering cases with multiplicity (for instance examples with negative debt positions, which make the implementability condition no longer a convex constraint) could make it even more challenging for today's government to induce commitment by future governments.
Second, our example does not rely on the presence of an infinite horizon, which we only choose here to be consistent with Lucas-Stokey. A T -period version of this example would yield the same conclusion, namely that in some cases, the optimal policy under commitment does not coincide with that under lack of commitment. In the Appendix, we evaluate such a finite horizon economy. We show that the same conclusions hold, and we explicitly characterize policy under lack of commitment using backward induction in the cases where the optimal policy is not time-consistent.
Markov Perfect Competitive Equilibrium
Given the limitations of the Lucas-Stokey analysis, we propose an alternative approach to studying fiscal policy under lack of commitment. Rather than analyzing whether the optimal commitment policy survives a one-time future reoptimization, we characterize the MPCE in which the government without commitment chooses taxes and debt at every date, taking into account how current policy affects the price of bonds through expectations of future policy. Such a government without commitment may not choose the optimal commitment policy. In this section, we formally define our equilibrium, and then, using the primal approach, we provide a recursive representation of the equilibrium.
Equilibrium Definition
Formally, let B t ≡ {B t,k } ∞ k=1 and q t ≡ {q t,k } ∞ k=1 . In every period t, the government chooses a policy {τ t , B t } given B t−1 . Households then choose an allocation and portfolio c t , n t , {b t,k } ∞ k=1 . An MPCE consists of: a government strategy ρ (B t−1 ) which is a function of B t−1 ; a household allocation and portfolio strategy ω (B t−1 , ρ t , q t ) which is a function of B t−1 , the government policy ρ t = ρ (B t−1 ), and bond prices q t ; and a set of bond pricing functions ϕ
with q t,k = ϕ k (B t−1 , ρ t ) ∀k ≥ 1 which depend on B t−1 and the government policy ρ t = ρ (B t−1 ). In an MPCE, these objects must satisfy the following conditions ∀t:
1. The government strategy ρ (·) maximizes (2) given ω (·), ϕ k (·) ∀k ≥ 1, and the government budget constraint (4);
2. The household allocation and portfolio strategy ω (·) maximizes (2) 
∀k ≥ 1, and the household budget constraint (3), and 3. The set of bond pricing functions ϕ k (·) ∀k ≥ 1 satisfy (5) given ρ (·) and ω (·).
Recursive Representation
Given our definition, an MPCE is characterized by an equilibrium consumption and labor sequence (7) and an equilibrium debt sequence
, where each element at date t depends on history only through B t−1 , the payoff relevant variables. Given this observation, in an MPCE, one can define a function h k (·)
for k ≥ 1, which equals the discounted marginal utility of consumption at t + k given B t at t. This function is useful since, in choosing B t at date t, the government must take into account how it affects future expectations of policy, which in turn affect current bond prices through expected future marginal utility of consumption. Note that choosing {τ t , B t } at date t from the perspective of the government is equivalent to choosing {c t , n t , B t } where one can write, with some abuse of notation,
, and this follows from the primal approach delineated in Section 2.2. Removing the time subscript and defining B ≡ B t−1 = {b k } ∞ k=1 as the inherited portfolio of bonds, we can write the government's problem recursively as
s.t.
c + g = n, and (27)
where (28) 
Stationary Distribution of Debt Maturity
We focus on characterizing an economy in which the debt maturity distribution is stationary with b t+1,k = b t,k , ∀t, k, so that government debt maturity is time-invariant. Given the Markovian structure of the solution to the MPCE defined by (26)−(28), such a stationary maturity distribution is associated with tax rates, consumption, and interest rates that are constant over time. In this section, we show that any stationary maturity distribution must be flat, with the government owing the same amount of resources to the private sector at all future dates. To establish this result, we first impose a useful assumption in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we use this assumption show that a flat maturity distribution is stationary. Finally, in Section 5.3, we show that no other maturity distribution can be stationary.
Preliminaries
Before proceeding with our analysis, we impose a useful assumption. Using our recursive notation introduced in Section 4, define W ({b k } ∞ k=1 ) as the welfare of the government under full commitment given an initial starting debt position {b k } ∞ k=1 :
Given Lemma 1, the program in (29) 
and c
This assumption states that if a government under full commitment is faced with a flat maturity distribution, then there is a unique optimum in which the government chooses a constant allocation of consumption and labor in the future.
7 This assumption is intuitive.
Under a flat maturity distribution, every time period in the program in (29) − (31) is identical in the objective function and in the constraint set, which suggests that the optimal solution is a time-invariant allocation. A sufficient condition for Assumption 1 is that the function u c (c, c + g) (c − b) + u n (c, c + g) (c + g) is concave in c for all b, which is the case, for example, if the utility function satisfies (11) as in our example in Section 3 and if b = 0 so that debt is non-negative.
Flat Maturity Distribution is Stationary
We begin by establishing that if the maturity distribution is flat, then it is stationary. The first part of the lemma states that in any MPCE, if the government inherits a flat maturity distribution with b k = b ∀k, then the unique optimal response of the government is to choose consumption and labor that coincide with the commitment optimum. The second part of the lemma implies that one optimal-but not necessarily uniquely optimal-strategy for the government is to choose b k = b ∀k so that debt is not rebalanced and the maturity distribution continues to be flat in the future. As such, there exists a stationary MPCE with a flat maturity distribution. Importantly, this lemma implies that in any MPCE for which B is a flat maturity distribution, it is necessary that
so that there is no welfare loss for the present government due to lack of commitment by future governments. The logic behind this lemma is that a government inheriting a flat maturity distribution with b k = b ∀k can always decide to not rebalance its debt portfolio and to choose the tax rate associated with {c * (b) , n * (b)}. Forward induction on this observation combined with Assumption 1 means that the government is able to achieve the commitment optimum with this strategy while inducing allocation {c * (b) , n * (b)} in all future periods.
Note that the government can induce the commitment allocation in the future in any MPCE, including those where the government's continuation strategy off the equilibrium path given off equilibrium maturities does not coincide with the commitment solution.
No Other Maturity Distribution is Stationary
We now turn to the possibility that another maturity distribution is stationary. We show in this section that this is not possible by contradiction using an induction argument. The first step of the induction argument establishes that if a non-flat maturity distribution were stationary, then the debt immediately due, b 1 , would be necessarily equal to the primary surplus. The second step of the induction argument establishes that if a non-flat maturity distribution were stationary with b k equal to the primary surplus for all k ≤ m, then b m+1 would necessarily be equal to the primary surplus. It follows then by induction that b k equals the primary surplus for all maturities k and that the maturity distribution is flat, leading to a contradiction. To pursue this induction argument, we establish a preliminary result that allows us to construct perturbations as part of the induction argument. To interpret this lemma, observe that since consumption is constant over time under a stationary maturity distribution, the price of a bond maturing in k periods is β k .
Lemma 4 Suppose that given B, there exists a solution to ( 
This lemma states that under any MPCE with a stationary maturity distribution that is not flat, the government can choose the same tax rate but issue a flat maturity distribution with the same market value and achieve the same welfare. The proof of this lemma is facilitated by Lemma 3, which characterizes the continuation equilibrium following this choice of a flat maturity. Since current and future taxes and consumption remain unchanged from the issuance of a flat maturity, bond prices and welfare are also unchanged.
Lemma 4 implies that if there exists a stationary maturity distribution that is not flat, then the corresponding welfare is equal to that achieved under a flat maturity distribution with the same market value. Moreover, from (34), welfare under this MPCE equals that under commitment associated with a flat maturity distribution with the same market value:
Lemma 4 is useful since it characterizes welfare under a stationary maturity distribution that is not flat. Moreover, it allows us to consider off-equilibrium welfare following a deviation in maturity issuance strategy by the government, which is useful for establishing the first step of our induction argument in the next lemma.
Lemma 5 Suppose that given B, there exists a solution to (26) − (28) with a stationary maturity distribution b k = b k ∀k and for which {c, n} = c f b , n f b . Then, B must satisfy
This lemma states that in any stationary maturity distribution in which the tax rate is not zero (so that consumption and labor do not equal the first best), short-term debt b 1 equals the annuitized value of total debt b. Therefore, the primary surplus equals the short-term debt b 1 and net debt issuance is zero.
The proof rests on showing that if the primary surplus is in excess of, or below, this short-term debt b 1 , then the government can pursue a deviation from a smooth consumption path to boost welfare. For example, if the primary surplus is in excess of what the government immediately owes, then pursuit of a smooth consumption path would require the government to buy back some of its long-term debt. Rather than following a stationary debt issuance strategy, the government can back-load consumption to increase short-term interest rates and reduce the value of the long-term debt which it buys back. Since the deviation is beneficial, the maintenance of a stationary debt maturity distribution is not optimal if the primary surplus exceeds b 1 .
If instead the primary surplus is below what the government immediately owes, then pursuit of a smooth consumption path would require the government to issue fresh debt in order to repay current short-term debt. Rather than following a stationary debt issuance strategy, the government can front-load consumption to decrease short-term interest rates and increase the value of newly issued debt. Since the deviation is beneficial, the maintenance of a stationary debt maturity distribution is not optimal if the primary surplus is below b 1 .
Note that in constructing these deviations, we utilize Lemmas 3 and 4 which allow us to characterize the change in welfare if the government issues a flat government debt maturity today as part of its deviation. As such, we can explicitly show that these deviations increase welfare by relaxing the government's budget constraint.
Note that the reason why our argument does not hold under a stationary distribution of debt maturities with zero taxes is that in this case, it is not possible to relax the government budget constraint further.
We now use analogous arguments to establish the second step of the induction argument.
Lemma 6 Suppose that given B, there exists a solution to (26) − (28) with a stationary maturity distribution b k = b k ∀k and for which {c,
This lemma considers the stationary maturity distribution when all bond maturities below m equal the primary surplus of the government (the annuitized value of government debt). When this is the case, then the bond of maturity m+1 must also equal the primary surplus of the government.
The argument, which relies on a proof by contradiction, starts from the fact that under a stationary maturity distribution, government's welfare satisfies (36), and thus equals welfare under commitment with a flat maturity distribution with the same market value. Now if the amount owed at date m + 1 does not also equal the primary surplus, then there exists a feasible deviation from a stationary debt issuance strategy that can increase welfare above (36), leading to a contradiction.
More specifically, if b l = b ∀l ≤ m but b m+1 = b, a feasible strategy for the government today is to continue to choose the same consumption and labor allocation today {c( b), n( b)} but to deviate by not retrading the inherited maturities (i.e., letting the bonds mature to next period). Such a deviation is feasible whatever the expectations of future policy and their impact on current bond prices since the government is not rebalancing its portfolio.
Without needing to specify the exact form of the continuation equilibrium, we can show that this deviation must necessarily increase welfare. The argument rests on putting a lower bound on the welfare of future governments following the deviation based on the feasible policies at their disposal. More specifically, note that after the initial deviation, future governments also have the opportunity to pursue the same strategy of choosing consumption and labor equal to {c( b), n( b)} and not rebalancing the portfolio of maturities. This is true up until some future date m periods in the future. Based on this logic, the welfare of the government today from pursuing the deviation must weakly exceed
where B (m) satisfies b (m) k = b k+m ∀k ≥ 1. Thus, for the initial deviation to be weakly dominated, this requires (37) to be weakly exceeded by (36), so that
However, since b m+1 = b, the arguments of Lemma 5 imply that (38) cannot hold, leading to a contradiction. Intuitively, m periods into the future after following a strategy of no rebalancing, the primary surplus is above or below the debt immediately due. At this point in the future, pursuing a strategy that back-loads or front-loads consumption strictly increases welfare relative to a smooth consumption policy with a stationary debt issuance strategy. Therefore, the immediate deviation prior to reaching this m'th period is beneficial, and the maintenance of a stationary debt maturity distribution is not optimal.
Proposition 2 (flat maturity) Suppose that conditional on B, there exists a solution to (26) − (28) with a stationary maturity distribution b k = b k ∀k and for which {c, n} = c f b , n f b . Then it is necessary that b k = b ∀k so that the maturity distribution is flat.
This proposition represents the main result of the paper. It states that if the maturity distribution is stationary and if the equilibrium does not entail first best consumption and labor, then the maturity distribution is flat. The reasoning for the proposition follows from induction arguments which appeal to Lemmas 5 and 6. Intuitively, if maturity distribution is not flat, then there are opportunities for the government take advantage of these imbalances to decrease the market value of its inherited portfolio or increase the market value of its newly-issued portfolio. Note that this result holds in any MPCE and does not appeal to any assumptions regarding the behavior of future governments.
Our result relies on the stationary maturity distribution not being associated with first best consumption and labor. Under such a stationary distribution, taxes would be zero, the market value of debt would be sufficiently negative to finance the stream of government spending forever, and the marginal benefit of resources for the government would be zero. For this reason, the stationary maturity distribution is not determined in this circumstance. We can trivially rule out this case if there are exogenous bounds on government debt which prevent such asset accumulation for the government. Finally, returning to Lemma 3, note that Proposition 2 also implies that starting from a flat maturity distribution, the unique continuation equilibrium requires the issuance of a flat maturity distribution. Therefore, in any MPCE, a flat government debt maturity is an absorbing state, and all flat maturity distributions are stationary. Starting from a flat maturity distribution, the current government would like to guarantee a constant level of consumption and labor going forward. Choosing a maturity distribution that is not flat cannot guarantee such a continuation equilibrium, since future governments will deviate from a smooth policy in order to relax the government budget constraint. For this reason, the government chooses a flat maturity distribution, and a flat maturity distribution is an absorbing state.
A natural question concerns whether an MPCE can converge to a stationary distribution over time. A complete analysis of MPCE's in an infinite horizon economy with an infinite choice of debt maturities is analytically infeasible in the cases where the commitment and no-commitment solutions do not coincide; this is because Lucas-Stokey techniques do not apply. In the Appendix, we analyze transitions in a T -period economy and we present examples where the economy transitions to a flat maturity distribution in finite time.
6 Concluding Remarks
An important literature on optimal fiscal policy without commitment has built on the Lucas-Stokey conclusion that a government can structure its debt maturity to guarantee commitment by future governments. In this paper, we overturn this result, using the same model and the same definition of time-consistency as Lucas-Stokey under standard assumptions on preferences.
Motivated by this finding, we propose an alternative approach to studying fiscal policy under lack of commitment. Rather than analyzing whether the optimal commitment policy survives a one-time future reoptimization, as previous work has done, we characterize the equilibrium when the government reoptimizes sequentially and may deviate from the optimal commitment policy. We consider an MPCE in which the government chooses policy as a function of the infinite-dimensional portfolio of government bonds that it inherits in every period. Our analysis applies to the entire set of MPCE's, including those with potentially discontinuous policy functions both on and off the equilibrium path. We find that any stationary distribution of debt maturity must be flat, with the government owing the same amount at all future dates. Our analysis thus provides a theoretical argument for the use of consols in debt management based on the sequential optimization of fiscal policy by the government.
In our framework, we have considered a situation in which a government's objective in its debt issuance strategy is to minimize its financing costs. In practice, government debt management offices also pursue other objectives, such as supporting financial stability. For example, this can be achieved either by providing liquidity to segments of the market that lack it or through the bond auction process, which itself may serve a purpose of aggregating financial market information. How these factors matter for the optimal maturity management of government debt is an interesting question for future research.
Appendix
Appendix A. Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1
The necessity of these conditions is proved in the text. To prove sufficiency, let the government choose the associated level of debt {b t,k } ∞ k=1 ∞ t=0 which satisfies (9) and a tax sequence {τ t } ∞ t=0 which satisfies (8). Let bond prices satisfy (8). (9) given (1) implies that (3) and (4) are satisfied. Therefore household optimality holds and all dynamic budget constraints are satisfied along with the market clearing, so the equilibrium is competitive.
Appendix B. Proofs of Section 3 Proof of Lemma 2
We prove this lemma in four steps.
Step 1. We first establish that the problem is concave and the solution unique.
Consider the relaxed problem in which (14) is replaced with
We can establish that (B.1) holds as an equality in the relaxed problem, implying that the relaxed and constrained problems are equivalent. If instead (B.1) held as an inequality in the relaxed problem, the solution to the relaxed problem would admit c t = c f b ∀t. Given
which is a contradiction since b −1,1 > 0. Therefore, (B.1) holds as an equality in the solution to the relaxed problem and the solutions to the relaxed and constrained problems coincide. Since the left hand side of (B.1) is strictly concave in c t given that b −1,1 > 0 and since the objective (13) is strictly concave, it follows that the solution is unique.
Step 2. We now establish the first two parts of the lemma. Letting µ 0 > 0 correspond to the Lagrange multiplier on (B.1), the first order condition for c 0 is (15). The first order condition for c t for all t ≥ 1 is
Since the left hand side of (B.2) is strictly decreasing in c t , it follows that the solution to (B.2) is unique with c t = c 1 ∀t ≥ 1, where (16) defines c 1 . It follows from the fact that the program is strictly concave and constraint set convex that satisfaction of (15) − (17) is necessary and sufficient for optimality for a given µ 0 > 0. We are left to verify that c 0 > c 1 . Note that the left hand side of (15) is strictly increasing in b −1,1 and strictly decreasing in c 0 for a given µ 0 > 0. Therefore, c 0 is strictly increasing in b −1,1 for a given µ 0 > 0, where c 0 = c 1 if b −1,1 = 0. It follows then that since b −1,1 > 0, c 0 > c 1 .
Step 3. We now establish the last part of the lemma. We first show that the solution to the system in (15)−(17) admits c 1 which is strictly decreasing in
correspond to the function on the left hand side of (15), let F 1 (c 1 , µ 0 ) correspond to the function on the left hand side of (16), and let I (c 0 , c 1 , b −1,1 ) correspond to the function on the left hand side of (17). Since the solution to this system of equations is unique, we can apply the Implicit Function Theorem. Implicit differentiation yields
From the second order condition for (15) and (16) To determine the sign of the numerator, let us expand the numerator by substituting in for the functions. By some algebra, the numerator is equal to
This establishes that c 1 is strictly decreasing in b −1,1 .
Step 4. Given step 3, we complete the proof of the last part of the lemma by es- To see that this solution exists, note that
Therefore, a value of µ 0 > 0 which satisfies (16) exists. Multiply (15) by c 0 and substitute (17) into (15) to achieve
(B.5) Note that given the value of µ 0 > 0 satisfying (16) for c 1 = c laf f er , a solution to (B.5) which admits c 0 > 0 exists. This is because the left hand side of (B.5) goes to
as c 0 goes to 0, where we have used the fact that g < 1 η
1/γ
. As c 0 goes to infinity, the left hand side of (B.5) becomes arbitrarily negative. Therefore a solution to (B.5) for c 0 > 0 exists. Given that b −1,1 enters linearly in (17), it follows that a value of b −1,1 which satisfies the system also exists. This establishes the last part of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1
We consider each case separately. (19) and (20) for some µ 1 > 0. Therefore, to check that the date 1 solution admits c t = c 1 ∀t ≥ 1 for c 1 which satisfies (16), it is sufficient to check that there exists some µ 1 > 0 satisfying (20) . Using (B.6) to substitute in for b 0,k in (20), we find that
where we have appealed to the fact that c 1 < c f b (from (16)) to assign a positive sign to the numerator in (B.7) and the fact that c 1 > c laf f er to assign a negative sign to the denominator in (B.7). This establishes that the date 0 solution is time-consistent. Case 2. Suppose by contradiction that the optimal date 0 policy is time-consistent.
This would require (20) to hold for c t = c 1 ∀t ≥ 1 for c 1 < c laf f er which satisfies (16). For a given µ 1 , satisfaction of (20) thus requires that b 0,k = b 0,1 ∀k ≥ 1. Equation (19) thus implies that (B.6) for b 0,k > 0 holds, and substitution of (B.6) into (20) implies that ∀k. This satisfies the resource constraint (27) and the implementability constraint (28). Therefore, it follows that
Equations (C.9) and (C.10) imply that
Therefore, it follows that any solution to (26) − (28) given
and n = n * (b).
Proof of Lemma 4
Conditional on B, if a solution admits b k = b k , then this means that B is an absorbing state with B = B and consumption and labor are constant and equal to some {c, n} from that period onward. Therefore,
As such, (28) can be rewritten as
which combined with (35) and the fact that
Now consider the solution to the following problem given b:
It is necessary that V (B) be weakly below the value of (C.14). This is because the solution to V (B) also admits a constant consumption and labor (as in the program in (C.14)) and since the constraint set in (C.14) is slacker, since the program ignores the role of government debt in changing future policies. Note furthermore that the value of (C.14) equals
, where this follows from Assumption 1. Therefore,
Now consider the welfare of the government in the MPCE if, instead of choosing b k = b k ∀k, it instead chooses b k = b ∀k with c = c * ( b) and n = n * ( b). It follows from Lemma 3 that under this perturbation,
plies that the resource constraint (27) and implementability constraint (28) are satisfied under this deviation. Because the continuation value associated with this deviation is
follows that for this deviation to be weakly dominated:
Given (C.15) and (C.16), it follows that
. Therefore, given B, there exists another solution to (26) − (28) with b k = b ∀k which achieves the same welfare.
Proof of Lemma 5
Before proving this lemma, define c laf f er analogously as in Section 3: Given this definition, we can proceed to prove this lemma by contradiction. By Lemma 4, where this follows from Lemma 3. This means that h
deviation. In order to satisfy the resource constraint and implementability condition, let the government deviate today to a consumption and labor allocation { c, n} which satisfies
where we have appealed to the definition of b in (35). For such a deviation to be weakly dominated, it must be that
Clearly, the value of the right hand side of (C. 
the unique levels of consumption and labor which maximize welfare given b and are defined in (32) and (33). Letting µ 1 represent the Lagrange multiplier on the implementability condition for the program defining
Since {c * , n * } = {c f b , n f b } by the statement of the lemma, (C.23) implies that µ 1 = 0.
Using this observation, implicit differentiation of (32) and (33) taking (C.23) into account implies
higher consumption and higher welfare. Since u cc (c * , n * ) + u cn (c * , n * ) < 0, satisfaction of
Given that { c, n} = {c * , n * } = {c laf f er , c laf f er + g}, it can be verified from ( follows that (C.34) holds with equality and that choosing a flat maturity distribution going forward is optimal. Now we prove by contradiction that b m+1 = b. Suppose it were the case that b m+1 = b. This means that starting from B(m), the immediate debt which is owed by the government does not equal b. If this is the case, then the same arguments as those in the proof of Lemma 5 imply that there exists a deviation from the government's equilibrium strategy at B(m) which can strictly increase the government's welfare. However, if this is the case, (C.34) which holds with equality is violated. Therefore, it must be that b m+1 = b. In the case where the solution under commitment admits c 1 = c 2 > c laf f er -so that (D.47) and (D.48) do not bind-this result is immediate and follows from the arguments in Lucas-Stokey. Optimal tax rates under commitment mirror initial maturities, and are therefore stationary beyond a particular horizon. This eventual stability is guaranteed with a transition to a flat maturity under no commitment, since otherwise the date 1 government would not choose c 1 = c 2 .
In the cases where the commitment and no-commitment solutions do not coincide, the argument is more subtle. The date 0 government clearly desires a stable tax rate from date 1 onward given its initial maturities. However, if this desired tax rate exceeds the revenue-maximizing tax rate defining the peak of the Laffer curve, the date 0 government realizes that it cannot commit the date 1 and date 2 governments to its desired policy. Facing this binding upper bound on future tax rates captured by (D.47) and (D.48), the government chooses all future tax rates to equal the revenue-maximizing tax rate. To achieve this future outcome, it issues a flat maturity distribution associated with the natural debt limit.
This example suggests that our results from the main text are robust to the consideration of a finite horizon economy. We have also verified through numerical examples that Proposition 3 continues to hold with preferences that admit γ > 1 in a horizon that exceeds three periods. Details available upon request. and which replaces (D.46) with a relaxed constraint
